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Peace, Or The Problem-Free Interval
Inter-Program Evaluation and A General Outcome Measure
Roger A. Lohmann, Ph.D.
West Virginia University

Introduction
This paper argues for wider recognition of general program indicators as
evaluative criteria and sets forth four general dimensions of outcome
measures that might serve as comparative evaluative indicators for a wide
range of programs and services. The argument for general program
indicators of problem presence, frequency, duration and severity is grounded
in general problem-solving theory and is part of an evaluative study of a
mental health crisis unit. Peace, defined as a problem-free interval, is offered
as an example of a general program outcome indicator.
Most contemporary program evaluation involves endogenous comparison
between the goals or purposes of a program and its accomplishments;
between aspirations and results. Little attention has been devoted to the
companion problem of exogenous evaluation: to the comparison (the
valuation, if you will) of different goals or different accomplishments. While
endogenous evaluation speaks to the issue of whether or not a particular
intervention may be effective in some degree on its own terms, such
evaluations typically cannot be used to compare different interventions.
Although the discussion is carried forward here in the context of
effectiveness, exactly the same comments about exogenous and endogenous
evaluation apply to efficiency as an evaluative criterion. Exogenous
evaluation is necessary in order to make such determinations.
In pursuit of solutions to the problem of endogenous evaluation of social
work practice, we have tended to ignore or downplay the problem of
exogenous evaluation. As a result, we have led ourselves to believe, and
sought to convince others, that the central problem of practice evaluation is
the choice between effective and ineffective interventions. This is a
fundamentally false conclusion and utterly misleading. It might be
comforting to believe that all evaluations conform to the popular political
rhetorical choices between “ineffective" and “effective” programs. To the
extent that this is the case, strictly endogenous approaches to evaluation
would be justified. However, in the real world of contemporary practice, that
is seldom the case.
The fact is that in the real worlds of practice and program planning, the
more typical and momentous choice may be between two or more alternative

interventions each of which is either arguably or demonstrably – on the basis
of separate endogenous evaluations – effective (or, ineffective). Where the
choice is clearly between a provably effective (or efficient) program and a
demonstrably ineffective (or inefficient) one, preference is always for the
former. But, in reality, such choices are few and far between.
What about the more troubling (and much more common) cases where the
choice is between two provably effective programs? Or, the even more
troubling cases of choice among marginally ineffective ones? No matter how
far we push back the horizons, at some point, the problem of exogenous
evaluation will arise sooner or later: Sometimes it is necessary to compare or
evaluate different objects. In such cases, we must search out measures or
criteria that are object-neutral; not predisposing us in favor of one choice or
another. Thus, by various routes, we will inevitably arrive sooner or later at
the problem of exogenous evaluations and general program indicators.

General Program Indicators
A general program indicator can be defined as a measure of program
performance that can be applied to several different programs
simultaneously. A program, in this case, is indicated by a distinct set of
objectives. Thus, a general program indicator is one that can be used to
compare different but programmatically related programs. Economists have
been generally more interested than other social scientists in such
comparisons. The general economic approach is to compare any two (or more)
programs – no matter how different – using the common metric of money.
Thus, measuring the increased earnings capacity of graduates of several
different types of vocational and higher education programs is an example of
such an indicator used widely in cost-benefit studies. The real question
behind this investigation is whether it is possible to construct such general
program indicators using a metric other than money.
A general program indicator should serve several purposes: First, it
should enable comparisons between qualitatively different programs,
including those with different goals, those operating in different
communities, states or regions, and those serving different client groups.
Second, a general program indicator should have both social and individual
connotations, in order to allow considerations of the effects of both individual
interventions and entire programs. Thirdly, in order to be genuinely useful, a
general program should be comparative; to provide a common metric for
assessing the amount and direction of change brought about by two distinct
programs. Finally, a comparative indicator should allow us to deal both with
questions of ends and purposes and with questions of means and resources.
An indicator of this type consists of two components: A concept with explicit
substantive and theoretical implications and a measure with explicit
operational implications.

General program indicators of this type are noticeably absent in most
areas of contemporary social work practice, and where they do exist, their
programmatic significance is seldom clear. One such comparative indicator in
widespread use (and already mentioned here) is simple monetary
measurement: We can, in most instances, note that program A expended
$51,241 and program B expended $24,241. What exactly this tells us about
the two programs (other than the fact that one spent more than twice as
much as the other) is not clear.
The focus of this paper is to outline the development of a set of indicators
that may be useful for evaluation of a broad range of social welfare and
related endeavors. The underlying concept involved is theoretically grounded
in the pragmatic concept of problems and problem solving as a general model
of social work intervention. As such, the proposed model also has
implications for all of social work practice as well as large portions of
planning and management and intervention in public health, community
development and other fields. The model does not apply to activities that
cannot be meaningfully described as problem-solving efforts.

Background
The emphasis on endogenous evaluation has produced a style of
evaluation that might best be called methodological individualism. Such
individualism has led in turn to a vast proliferation of special purpose
evaluation measures. There are a number of debatable assumptions that
form the basis for such an approach. For one thing, most social scientists who
have worked on the development of program indicators have treated the
issue of outcome assessment as methodological rather than theoretical (C.f.,
Caro, 1970; Rossi, Freeman and Wright, 1979). The basis for establishing the
ends of programs and important questions such as who is qualified to
determine such ends are treated as nonproblemmatic. Thus, the development
of many evaluative indicators today employs the strategy of operational
definition of variables derived on a largely ad hoc basis from preliminary
analysis or study of the situation to be evaluated (Kidder and Judd, 1986;
Rubin, 1983; Selltiz, 1959).
This approach to program evaluation has been the dominant one for more
than two decades. On the basis of this experience, it is possible to conclude
that this "middle range" strategy (Merton, 1948) results in a threadbare
methodological individualism in which there are strong incentives (including
professional pride and career advancement opportunities) for each
investigator to feel compelled to start anew in each evaluation with the
definition of goals, measures and scales. When combined with widespread
inattention to general theory, such methodological individualism literally
begins nowhere and ends nowhere, but moves from here to there very
precisely! Further, without general, comparative indicators of some type, the
growing mountain of ad hoc measures developed over the past two decades

point only toward further methodological individualism and continuing
proliferation of plausible suggested measures that generate grants, tenure
and promotion for researchers, but raise only slight interest among
practitioners, decision makers and policy makers. Whatever other
advantages they may have, proposals for standardized packages of such
individualistic measures, like Hudson’s clinical measurement package, do not
really address large parts of the issue of exogenous evaluation, since by
definition they preclude comparisons of or with nonclinical alternatives.

General Models
What is needed are general models linking operations to outcomes in
more general ways and enabling comparisons of different outcomes across
programs. This was part of the original program of English utilitarianism,
and one of the reasons for its enduring attraction for decision-makers:
whether labeled "happiness", "utility", "welfare," "subjective utility", "the
pleasure/pain calculus" or by some other name, there is little doubt that
utilitarianism aims for such a universal measure. Likewise, there is little
doubt that this measure, by whatever name, has held little intrinsic interest
in social work practice except for administrative/financial decisions.
If, initially, it should prove impossible to create a model of sufficient
generality to encompass all possible evaluations, we might still be guided by
a general rule of thumb for generality that any model that applies to more
situations is preferable to one that applies to fewer, all other things being
equal. In the following pages we shall be concerned with such a model in the
context of problem-solving: No claims are made for its universal generality to
all human “problems”. Yet, it is claimed that it can be applied to a broad (if
unspecified) class of problems that includes, but is not necessarily limited to
problems of poverty, mental illness, illness and diseases or all sorts, abuse,
neglect and domestic violence, alcohol and substance abuse and disabilities.
For reasons that will become clear, this class of problems shall be referred to
in general as problems of “social dependency”.

A Problem-Solving Model
The very first step in identification of a general indicator of successful
intervention involves identifying the "something" in common that all
interventions in a general class possess. A number of possibilities arise: The
utilitarian/economic tradition would argue for “utility”, “happiness” or
“welfare” as such a measure. In general, utility models may be useful for
endogenous comparisons but are seldom useful for exogenous comparative
purposes, because they fail to overcome the problems of interpersonal
comparison (Sen, 1982). Others might suggest some variation of "need" or “need
reduction” as common dimensions. However, need also appears to suffer from
problems of psychological reduction, as well as measurement problems (there

being no widely recognized general measures of need, despite the widespread
rhetorical uses of this concept.)
Problem-solving is the most widely accepted model of contemporary social
work practice, incorporated into official definitions of the field, and
encompassing all known and generally accepted modes of practice from therapy
to community planning. As such, the problem-solving model offers an
apparently broad range of possibilities for a set of general program indicators. In
fact, it appears to be the case that all problems of social work intervention can be
stated in terms of problem-solving models. The general view that one solves
problems by defining them, identifying alternatives, assessing alternative
intervention strategies, and choosing among them is, in fact, so universal in
social work practice, that to many it is considered virtually the natural attitude.
Thus, constructing a general program indicator within the logic of the problemsolving model has strong intuitive appeal.

Problems and Problem-Solving
Before we can begin to construct such a problem-solving indicator, however,
we need to look more closely at problem-solving theory. To Dewey and the
other pragmatists, the experience of a problem is a universal one for individuals
and groups. Recognizable problems erupt into the flow of "normal" (that is, nonproblematic) personal or group experience and divert attention away from other
things. In experiencing problems, we redirect our attention, temporarily or
permanently, from other concerns and focus on the problem -- on "what's
wrong". When the problem is resolved, we then direct our attention back to
other concerns. Thus, an important (and measurable) aspect of the meaning of
"solving" a problem is the redirection of attention away from the problem that
signals or indicates a "solution".
Walter Hudson once suggested that any client problem can be measured in
terms of its: 1) Binary status (presence or absence); 2) Frequency; 3) Duration;
or 4) Magnitude (intensity) (Hudson, 1982) Presence/absence could be treated
as a precondition rather than a characteristic of problems, since it is impossible
to determine the other characteristics of problems that are absent. Thus, we are
left with three primary dimensions around which it may be possible to organize
the comparison of different client problems. If these same characteristics can also
be applied generally to problems experienced by people before they become
clients and after they cease to be clients these same criteria might also be
extended to the comparison of clinical and non-clinical interventions. Thus,
comparison of the frequency, duration and intensity of problems could yield a
high-powered model of exogenous evaluation.

Binary Status
The diagnostic or definitional problem of whether or not a problem is or is
not present, as every practitioner knows, is not a straightforward, simple one.
There is, for example, the issue of dormancy as in cancer and other chronic
diseases. The problem may be there, but not demonstrating any evident

symptoms or characteristics at the moment. In the same vein, the symptoms or
characteristics may be below the threshold of observation. In the case of many
social problems, such as poverty or deviant behavior, there is also the voting
problem: If there are differences of opinion about whether the problem is
present, who is qualified or recognized to make the final determination of
whether or not a problem exists? The client? The practitioner? A panel of
neutral authorities? The community? And what is to be done if there are
differences of opinion?
As noted above, the status of a problem might be handled as a precondition
of problem measurement. However, there is at least heuristic value in following
Hudson’s binary logic as we shall see. Thus, one can stipulate that any actor
(person, group, organization, community, etc.) can at any particular moment be
in any of four states with respect to a particular problem:
At any given point with respect to a particular definable problem, one either
has the problem (to any extent) or not. Likewise, one may or may not be aware
of having any particular problem. Thus, one may have a problem and be aware
of it; have a problem and be unaware of it; perceive a problem one does not, in
fact, have; or knowingly have no (particular) problem.
In the latter instance, we may say unambiguously that one is “problem-free”.
Being problem-free would appear to be a more encompassing notion than
contrasting “problem” with “solution” since the former allows comparison not
only between those who have a problem and those who don’t; it also links those
who formerly had a problem with those who never did. As should be evident,
problem-status measures are, by their nature cross-sectional point-in-time
measures that in a dynamic world are constantly in need of update. To the extent
that the argument of this paper is successful, for example, those who have
completed this section will, it is hoped, be experiencing at least the vague,
inchoate sensations of an emerging intellectual problem. As such, they are
crossing the status boundary referred to above.
One of the foremost reasons for the kinds of professional assessment
activities in social work is to provide for authoritative resolution of binary status
issues. One of the roles of professional social work assessments is to certify that
problems do (or do not) exist, and to label and classify them as to type and kind.

Frequency
Frequency is a measure of how often a phenomenon recurs. The
measurement of frequency ordinarily involves counting or estimating
incidence, or the number of occurrences, in a given time period. In the
context of problem solving, frequency is thus a measure of how frequently the
problem in question recurs in a given time-period. As the Hudson model
noted above suggests, frequency is one of the fundamental measures of client
problems.
Contemporary social problem theory is often remarkable indifferent to
both frequency and duration. The usual approach is that either a problem is

eliminated completely and permanently, or else we conclude the program has
failed to achieve its objectives. This was the approach of Girls at Vocational
High, one of the early evaluative studies, where the issue was the eradication
of delinquency through casework intervention (Meyer, Borgotta & Jones,
1965). This was also the approach of the original Head Start evaluations,
where the finding that the effects of Head Start were only discernable for 4-5
years was widely considered evidence of the program's ineffectiveness
(Cicarelli, 1971; Evans, 1971). This was also the approach of Fischer's
negative assessment of the effectiveness of casework.(Fischer, 1970) Indeed,
this has been the approach of much social program evaluation.
The proliferation of endogenous evaluation in the public policy arena has
probably exacerbated this kind of ideal suggesting that client problems that
are effectively dealt with will occur only once. They will be diagnosed,
effectively and efficiently treated and never again reappear. Thus, recurrent
problems of a similar type can be interpreted in themselves as evidence of
ineffective problem-solving. In the real worlds of clients, problems do recur
and the frequency with which they recur seems to be far less a matter of the
effectiveness of prior interventions than it is of the existential conditions of
clients' lives. Persistently and chronically mentally ill and substance-abusing
persons (to take two of the hardest cases) may be effectively "cured" time and
time again only to have their problems recur at some later date.
With all types of grave or serious problems, there is an absolute frequency
threshold: For murder, rape and child abuse, for example, a single
occurrence is too many. When such problems do recur, absolute cessation of
any additional occurrences is always the only morally acceptable standard.
However, it is a sad fact that such repeated occurrences do happen, despite
the best of intentions all around. In such cases, (often referred to as
"revolving door" episodes or problems) reducing the frequency of occurrence
may be of equal or greater importance as an objective to complete elimination
of the problem. We will return to this point below.

Duration
Duration is a measure of how long a problem lasts when it occurs.
Measurement of problem duration requires two time estimates: a
determination of time-of-onset and a determination of time-of-cure
(elimination or departure of the problem, or return to problem-free status).
Duration, then, is the elapsed time determined by subtracting onset from
cure. In theory, all problems and conditions are measurable by their
duration, as Hudson suggests. In reality, this is not always the case. By
definition, chronic diseases and conditions are those that last permanently,
or sufficiently long that measuring their duration is not practical or feasible.
In such cases, measurement of their duration may be impossible, counterintuitive or just plain pointless.

Another aspect of chronic conditions that confounds measurement of
duration is the problem of "invidious (or unknown point of) onset". It is quite
literally impossible in the cases of certain diseases like cancers, and social
problems like family violence, alcoholism, poverty, or stress to state exactly
when the problem began. One cannot determine with precision in many cases
even when awareness of the problem occurred. Indeed, the invidious
character of some types of problems points not to the point of origin of the
problem but only toward the existence of what might be termed the
"threshold of indifference.” The limits of the experience of these types of
problems are not onset to extinction, but rather the interval between an
initial "horizon of indifference" when the problem enters conscious experience
and a later "horizon of indifference" after which the problem is experienced
only as a memory. In the initial indifferent state, there would be no sense of
a problem (whether or not its presence might have been detected by a neutral
observer equipped with hindsight). And after the later threshold is passed,
the active experience of the problematic is past, regardless of whether or not
the problem is gone. Together, these two thresholds of indifference appear to
sufficient for defining the duration of a problem, as noted above. This may
even be the case, albeit in modified form, for problems involving unconscious
processes. Duration, in this sense, corresponds in many respects with the
epidemiological measurement of the prevalence of chronic diseases. Such
inter-threshold estimates of problem-duration may be useful in comparisons
determining program effectiveness across populations. In this, they might
function much like infant mortality statistics, for example, or cancerprevalence rates.
Psychosocial problems characterized by chronicity are also often
punctuated by various types of periodic crises and acute episodes whose onset
and departure can be measured more precisely and whose duration appears
to be programmatically meaningful: e.g., an alcoholic binge lasting five days
is ordinarily judged to be objectively more serious and damaging than one
lasting overnight, quite independent of any other information about the
person involved. As several decades of experience with crisis intervention
have made clear, a surprising number of social and psychological problems
share with many chronic diseases this quality of being punctuated by crises
of measurable duration, even if the duration of the underlying chronic
problem cannot be accurately estimated in non-trivial ways.
As with the discussion of relative frequency above, it is the case also that
in the absence of complete problem-elimination or cessation, reducing the
interval of problem-duration can be a general objective for many types of
intervention efforts. Moreover, with the aid of a seemingly straight forward
assumption, duration can be transformed into a genuinely comparative
measure.

It is certainly the case that, all other things (in particular, the status of
the client at discharge) being equal, reducing the duration of a problem can
be a significantly desirable program objective in many cases. Thus, ability to
reduce a transient psychotic episode (e.g., hallucinations) from a matter of
days to a matter of hours is a significant and nontrivial accomplishment,
independent of the complete prevention of all future psychotic episodes.
One of the reasons that this is so is closely related to what economists call
"the opportunity cost" of such an episode. A crisis episode of any sort is not
ordinarily judged as time well spent. (If you doubt this, just recall any
episode of personal vomiting or diarrhea.) Most people (including most
persistently and chronically mentally ill people) could, as a result, readily
identify the opportunity cost of such an episode in terms of things they would
rather have been doing during the time of a crisis. Thus, for example, the
opportunity cost of a crisis brought on by anxiety over a friend's wedding may
well be missing the wedding. Opportunity cost in this sense may offer a
number of clues to the general significance of duration in comparative
program evaluation (as well as severity, as we shall see below.)
In the immediate context, however, we are most concerned with an
assumption underlying this approach: For such an opportunity cost
comparison to be tenable requires, among others, an assumption of time
equivalence implicit in the very idea of duration. Roughly speaking, any
interval of time in a client or crisis-victim's life is roughly equal to the same
interval at another point in that life. A two-day binge in October is
equivalent to a two-day binge in December.
From this, it is but a small step to an assumption of truly comparative
character for duration: An interval of time in the life of any person is
roughly equivalent to the same interval of time in the life of another person.
Thus, twenty-seven crisis episodes in a year for Client A is more than 15
episodes in a year for Client B, even if Client A is an alcoholic and Client B is
persistently and chronically mentally ill. On the basis of the above
assumption, it is also the case that 31 days of outpatient treatment in a year
for Client B is a longer problem-duration than 15 days of psychiatric
hospitalization for Client C. To the extent that this is the case, duration, like
frequency offers a genuinely comparative indicator suitable for use as a
general program indicator.

Severity
It remains now to examine what Hudson calls problem magnitude (and
what will be termed severity here). By whatever name, comparative
measurement of the relative seriousness of different problems is certainly the
most challenging of all problem-dimensions from the standpoint of exogenous
evaluation. It is certainly the case that some problems (e.g., a broken finger

nail) may be less serious than others (e.g., a suicide attempt). Within the
pragmatic tradition of problem solving, such magnitude or seriousness or
intensity is ordinarily determined by the consequences of the problem. Thus
a broken fingernail is ordinarily judged a trivial problem precisely to the
degree that it is seldom painful, results in little or no functional impairment,
does not interfere with cognition or other psychological processes, does not
produce economic dislocation, social stigma or political disenfranchisement,
and is entirely reversible. By contrast, a suicide attempt is ordinarily judged
a more serious problem precisely because it may be extremely painful,
produce blindness, disability or other functional impairments, disrupt
psychological functioning in various ways, result in lost employment, social
stigma and at least temporary loss of civil rights, and may result in death.
Within the definition of problem offered by the pragmatic problem-solving
perspective, the number of problems faced by the ordinary person in a lifetime is enormous. And they range in seriousness from the problems of
choosing a career, a partner in life, or whether to die by jumping off a
building, to the problem of deciding which pair of shoes to wear or whether to
have dessert for lunch.
The concept of problem-severity in one sense implies being able to place
all problems on a ratio scale with a fixed zero point at which problemintensity is absolute zero (there is no problem) and an upper limit at which
intensity reaches some point of theoretical saturation (the problem boiling
point, as it were). This would be the analog of a social problem thermometer
that would enable the equivalent of "taking the client's temperature" to
determine the seriousness of each problem experienced. Unfortunately, there
is no discernable underlying analog to the core body temperature to make
such a measurement practically possible or theoretically meaningful, even if
such a scale were to be devisable.
One alternative approach to social work problem solving might be to
proceed to establish short, partial rank orderings of the intensity of selected
problems in comparison to designated other problems. It should be
theoretically possible to establish a complete rank ordering of the seriousness
of our problems, using a device like pair-wise matching. This, in fact,
corresponds to the modern approach to measurement of subjective utility in
economics and utilitarianism. Ordinal pairings of the intensity of problems
should allow us to determine which in any given pair of problems is “more”
and which is “less” serious, and eventually to establish complete rank
ordered series of problem seriousness. Although theoretically possible, this
problem of establishing such a complete rank ordering of all our problems is,
for most of us, sharply bounded by indifference. As a practical matter, I
simply do not care, in most instances, whether the selection of loaves of bread
in the supermarket is a greater or lesser problem for me than whether to
watch the television weather. The sequential flow of events in my life tends

to limit and constrain many such choices, rendering them irrelevant long
before I might complete the necessary rankings and this proves on the whole
to be a workable way to get through my day. However, at any given time and
place, certain choices will nonetheless present themselves. The first
assumption of any measurement of problem seriousness, therefore, is that it
will be an incomplete ranking of only selected problems. Thus, the issue of
criteria for selection of problems is, itself, an issue.

DSM-III, Axis IV
Assume, further, that the problems that most intrigue social workers can
be divided, very broadly, into at least four possible categories: organic
problems, involving the body or one or more of the major organ systems;
psychological problems, involving various cognitive and affective states;
economic/resource problems, involving broadly problems of survival and
social reproduction; and social/interactional problems, involving dealings
with others.
Then assume that the intensity of problems in each of these areas can be
plotted on a Likert-type scale from less severe to more severe. This would
yield four Likert scale items as follows (with unsubstantiated estimates of
where intervals between steps may occur w/o attempting to measure the
intervals):
Figure 1
Four Dimensions of a Problem
DSM-III,Axis IV Organic

Psychological

Resources

Interactional

None
Mild
Moderate
Severe
Extreme
Catastrophic

Bliss
Happiness
Contentment
Tension
Stress

Opulence
Wealth
Affluence
Poverty
Destitution
Survival

Transcendence
Autonomy
Unrec. Need
Impairment
Dependency

Health
Nuisance
Threat
Disability
Pain
Death

Peace: The Problem-Free Interval
Any one of these dimensions (organic, psychological, economic/resources
or interactional can also be characterized at any given point in time in terms
of its problem (or problem-free) interval, as shown in Figure 2 below. The
combined effect of these four dimensions can also be mapped as a Problem
Space (see Figure 3 below).
In such cases, it is fair to say that, within limits, problems delayed are
problems prevented. Thus, the timing of the onset and the duration of the

solution (its "problem-free interval") are important indicators of the success
of problem-solving efforts involving either prevention and intervention. (See
Appendix 1 below.)

Figure 2

For example, virtually all parents feel a sense of relief when their
children are no longer juveniles, for they know that whatever problems arose
in their children's teenage years, for most it probably could have been worse.
How often does one hear relatives, friends or neighbors concerned over a
particular juvenile warn "It's only a matter of time" before the kid gets into
trouble? But, in such developmental cases, trouble delayed sufficiently long
may mean trouble prevented. Eventually, maturity, and a new and different
range of issues and problems will probably replace those of adolescence.
There is, of course, another class of developmental problems where delay
merely aggravates the eventual problem-onset that can easily be fitted into
this same model.
Or, consider the question of prevention of skin cancer. The issue is not
really whether or not a very large share of us sitting in this room will get
some form of skin cancer. That is a foregone conclusion; virtually a byproduct of our genetic makeup, location on the planet and lifestyles. The real
issue is how long we can delay the onset and retard the progression of the
disease (with shade, sunscreens, etc.). That is, what our remaining problemfree interval will be. In skin cancer and many types of cancer treatment,

Figure 3
The Intensity of Problems

"remission" or slowing the development of the disease (or extending the
problem-free interval) is the treatment objective, and remission of sufficiently
long duration (for example, past the point of death from other causes) is
tantamount to cure. Consider also the problems of alcoholism, other forms of
substance abuse, and mental illness. In all of these cases, the "revolving
door" syndrome of repeated problem episodes followed by temporary cures
followed by repetition of the entire cycle ad infinitum is commonplace. In
such cases, it seems totally unrealistic to suggest that the only adequate
criterion for the effectiveness of alcohol treatment programs is some type of
"magic bullet" that will immediately and permanently reverse this cycle and
do so in the least costly manner possible. Likewise, is it really the case that
community treatment of the mentally ill is a failure when the chronic
mentally ill experience periodic psychotic episodes on the outside?
Or, consider problems like unemployment and homelessness where time
is also a factor of great importance and generally recognized as such by those
experiencing the problem. In both cases, sufferers typically express the
seriousness of their problem in terms of it duration: "I've been unemployed
for two years, now." "We've been looking for an apartment we could afford
for six months." Yet most measurements of these problems, whether of need
or the effectiveness of interventions deal only with static, cross-sectional
measures. We hear estimates of the number of homeless this year, without
indication of whether they were homeless for a night or a lifetime. Incumbent
administrations in Washington routinely claim they have achieved the lowest

unemployment rate in years whenever they can, with no consideration
whatsoever for how long the currently unemployed may have been that way.
This latter question, it should be noted also, is an issue of major importance
in the suspected emergence of a permanently unemployed underclass, and in
the related issue of structural unemployment.
Temporal perspective is also common applied to personal descriptions of
other major life crises and losses: Grieving widows common report "I lost my
husband 7 years ago this month." In the farm belt today, one hears often
"We lost our farm last January". In such cases, it is quite likely that there is
a correlation between the active experience of the problem and its experience
as time-related. The widow who is no longer actively grieving is more likely
to say "My husband is dead", and the ex-farmer who has made a satisfactory
life transition is likely to report that he used to be a farmer.
In sum, the failure to take the duration of social problems into account as
part of an interrelated set of evaluative measures ignores important
universal features of the problem experience and inhibits our ability to
compare problems. For activities that can be characterized as problemsolving, both the duration of the problem and the duration of the solution
appear to be potentially interesting and useful measures.

Conclusion
Problem-solving is one of the most common models of intervention. We
can measure critical dimensions of the comparative successes and failures of
problem-solving activities by comparing the peace that they bring--that is,
the duration of their respective problem free intervals. It is this period of
problem-freedom, and not the duration of problems, that offers the basis for
genuine comparative measurement of the effectiveness of problem-solving
efforts.
Peace, in the sense of a problem-free interval, can be employed as a purely
formal comparative measure of the elapsed time between resolution of a
problem episode and the onset of a new problem episode of the same type.
(See Appendix A below for assorted definitions of the term peace, which
accord with this labeling.) In the absence of overriding moral constraints that
render anything short of complete, life-time resolution of a problem
unacceptable, peace offers an important comparison of qualitatively different
types of problem-solving activity.

APPENDIX A
Peace Defined
The Random House Dictionary of the English
Language (New York. 1967) defines peace as:
"1. the normal, non-warring condition of a nation,
group of nations or the world. 2. an agreement or
treaty between warring or antagonistic nations,
groups, etc., to end hostilities and abstain from
further fighting or antagonism; the Peace of
Ryswick. 3. a state of mutual harmony between
people or groups, esp. in personal relations: Try to
live in peace with your neighbors. 4. the normal
freedom from civil commotion and violence of a
community; public order and security: He was
arrested for being drunk and breaking the peace. 5.
cessation of or freedom from strife or dissension. 6.
freedom of the mind from annoyance, distraction,
anxiety, an obsession, etc; tranquility, serenity. 7. a
state of tranquility or serenity: May he rest in
peace. 8. a state or condition conducive to,
proceeding from, or characterized by tranquility:
the peace of a mountain resort. 9. silence, stillness:
the cawing of a crow broke the afternoon's peace.
10. a comedy by Aristophenes (421 B.C.). 11.
holding one's peace. to refrain from or cease
speaking; keep silent: He told her to hold her
peace until he had finished. 12. keep the peace, to
maintain order; cause to refrain from creating a
disturbance: Several officers of the law were on
hand to keep the peace. 13. make one's peace, to
become reconciled; acquiesce: He repaired the fence
he had broken and made his peace with the
neighbor on whose property it stood. 14. make
peace, to ask for or arrange a cessation of hostilities
or antagonism. --v.i. 15. Obs. to be or become silent.
--interj. 16. keep still! silence!. . . . "
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